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Abstract This paper analyzes the effects of geographical proximity and agglomeration of fo-
reign direct investors on domestic ﬁrms in the privatized glass sector in the Czech Republic. The
motivation for this research is based on the scant evidence in Central and Eastern Europe of the
effects of geographical proximity and agglomeration on the productivity of domestic ﬁrms. This
study aims to explain how spillovers are transferred from foreign direct investors to domestic
ﬁrms in an industrial sector. The econometrical analysis, using original panel data from 1990 to
2006, provides evidence that the geographical proximitytoforeign directinvestors has a negative
and signiﬁcant effect on the productivity of domestic ﬁrms in the glass sector. The effect of ag-
glomeration of foreign direct investors is signiﬁcant, too. The results support the importance of
geographic proximity and the agglomeration of foreign direct investors as a channel of spillovers
and it conforms with the evidence that shows that foreign direct investors have produced negative
spillovers on domestic ﬁrms in transition countries. The analysis shows, however, that spillovers
do not play a dominant role for the performance of privatized domestic ﬁrms in the glass sector
and the importance of taking into account the industrial sector in the study of spillovers.
Keywords FDI, agglomeration economies, panel data, regional location, glass industry
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1. Introduction
Extensive evidence about spillovers in transition countries shows insigniﬁcant or nega-
tive generalized spillovers from foreign direct investors. Foreign direct investors have
not had positive spillovers as expected. The motivation for this study is based on the
results about spillovers that contrast the expectations and on the scant evidence in Cen-
tral and Eastern Europe of the effects of geographical proximity and agglomeration on
the productivity of domestic ﬁrms. The aim is to explain how the location of foreign
investors has affected the productivity of domestic ﬁrms, creating negative spillovers
to privatized ﬁrms.
This paper examines the effects of geographical proximity and agglomeration of
foreign direct investors on domestic ﬁrms using a population of privatized ﬁrms in the
glass sector in the Czech Republic. The main contribution of this paper is to analyze
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one channel of spillovers, i.e. the geographical proximity and agglomeration of foreign
investors and to provide an explanation for the lack of positive spillovers from foreign
investors.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the privatization process
in the glass sector in the Czech Republic and the reasons behind the choice of this
industrial sector. Section 3 summarizes the related theoretical and empirical literature
and describes its various contributions and shortcomings. Section 4 describes the data,
the methodology and discusses the variables used in the empirical analysis. Section 5
presents the empirical results and compares the ﬁndings of this work with those of
related studies. Section 6 provides concluding remarks.
2. Foreign investors and privatizated glassworks in the Czech Republic
The privatization of the glass sector was carried out under three different schemes:
restitution, small-scale privatization and large-scale privatization. The ﬁrst two sche-
mes were started in 1990 and were the most prominent in the early years of the tran-
sition. Large-scale privatization, by which the largest ﬁrms were privatized, began in
1991 and was completed by 1995 (Hanousek et al. 2007).
Smaller glassworks were typically privatized with the restitution programme, and
were auctioned off or sold in tenders. However, most of the previous owners of the
glassworks had to pay for taking back their family businesses because the state had
made some investments in the glasswork during the years of nationalization.1 In rare
cases, the privatization of ownership of the glasswork was given to the management,
as was the case of the Moser company.
The largest glassworks were privatized with a voucher program, as Vertex a.s. (to-
day Saint-Gobain Vertex a.s.) or sold directly to domestic and foreign investors as in,
respectively, Crystalex a.s. and Glavunion a.s. (today AGC Flat Glass Czech a.s.).2
The literature about the privatization and the effects of acquisitions from foreign
investors in the Czech Republic is extensive. However, there are no speciﬁc studies, ac-
cording to my research, about the spillover effects of foreign investors on the domestic
ﬁrms that focus on privatized ﬁrms in an industrial sector.
The decision to focus on ﬁrms existing in the central planning is done in order
to analyze the effects of foreign investors on privatized ﬁrms. Moreover, since these
ﬁrms were connected during central planning, it is plausible that the spillover effects of
foreign investors will be stronger; foreign investors will have stronger effects on their
neighbour domestic ﬁrms because of their common past and experiences. New ﬁrms in
the glass sector did not go through the privatization process and might not experience
such strong effects.
I have chosen the glass sector because this sector has a long tradition in the Czech
Republic and for this reason foreign investors entered during the privatization process
and did not enter with greenﬁeld investments as in other industrial sectors.
1 This information was conﬁrmed from personal interviews with Mr. Vlastimil Ber´ anek, owner of the glass-
work Ber´ anek, spol. s.r.o. (on 3rd September 2004), and Mr. Jiˇ r´ ı R¨ uckl, owner of the glasswork R¨ uckl
Crystal a.s. (on 10th September 2004).
2 For an extensive analysis of the AGC Flat Glass Czech case, see Galeotti and Nollen (2008).
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Czech glassworks are famous for their products and their long tradition suggests
that these companies possessed strong technology in glass manufacturing already du-
ring central planning, as shown by the history of Czech glass and by the participation
of Czechoslovak glassworks in international exhibitions. For example, Moser won the
gold medal at the International Exhibition of Decorative Arts in 1925 in Paris and par-
ticipated to several international exhibitions before 1989. Glavunion (now called AGC
Flat Glass Czech) was among the most productive enterprises in Czech industry during
central planning. However, even the most advanced enterprises had to face the transi-
tion to a market economy and had to learn how to operate in a new economic system.
The case study of the ACG Flat Glass (Galeotti and Nollen 2008) shows that even the
most technologically advanced enterprises have beneﬁted from the collaboration with
a foreign investor, especially concerning the possibility of accessing to new geographic
markets, learning how to manage successfully a company in an international environ-
ment and to restructure human capital, as well as in improving sales and marketing
policies.
The choice of the glass sector in the Czech Republic allows for study a type of
spillover that is harder to measure but very important. Instead of focusing on techno-
logy spillovers, even if foreign investors might bring an improvement in the technology
as well, I focus mainly on knowledge or informational spillovers.
3. Theoretical and empirical background
3.1 Evidence about horizontal spillovers in the transition countries
The existence of spillovers from foreign investors is a natural extension of the Owner-
ship, Location and Internalization (OLI) theory, according to which foreign investors
are motivated to enter foreign markets if they have some ﬁrm-speciﬁc advantages that
enable them to outperform local ﬁrms. At the same time they possess some intangible
asset, such as technology and know-how, that constitutes a potentially important gain
for the host country (Dunning 1981).
The research about spillovers from foreign investors has generated a large strand of
empirical studies in the transition countries and the results are opposed to the expec-
tations. The evidence has found insigniﬁcant or negative generalized spillovers from
multinationals located in the same industry (horizontal spillovers) (UNECE 2001). The
studies on the Czech Republic have also found mixed or negative spillovers from fo-
reign investors (Djankov and Hoekman 2000; Kinoshita 2000; Damijan et al. 2003a,
2003b; Kosov´ a 2006; Stanˇ c´ ık 2007; Gerˇ sl et al. 2007). Recent studies about spillovers
have concerned several transition countries and used large statistical databases (Gorod-
nichenko et al. 2007), but the evidence about horizontal spillovers remains weak or
mixed. Gorodnichenko et al. (2007), analyzing spillovers in 17 emerging countries,
have found mostly insigniﬁcant horizontal spillovers, except for older ﬁrms and ﬁrms
in the service sector which have positive ones.
G¨ org and Greenaway (2001, 2004) give three potential reasons for empirically fail-
ing to ﬁnd signiﬁcant spillovers. First, multinational corporations (MNCs) might be
very effective in protecting their technology advantages and preventing, in this way,
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potential spillovers. Second, spillovers may exist and make up some part of the resi-
dual that appears in all growth equations, but current statistical methods and datasets
are unable to identify them. Third, most of the studies have been carried out at the
aggregate level and using cross-sectional studies: there may be much heterogeneity of
spillovers and aggregate studies may therefore fail to detect them. Moreover, the poor
quality of data, limited samples of ﬁrms studied and short panels of ﬁrms may be other
reasons for failing to ﬁnd evidence of spillovers (Damijan et al. 2003b). Torlak (2004)
points out two further drawbacks of empirical studies. First, the problem of causality,
because MNCs may locate in high productive industries and do not improve with their
spillovers the industry productivity as usually it is believed.3 Second, the negative de-
mand effect from foreign investors may force less productive domestic ﬁrms to exit
the market while the MNCs increase their market shares which ﬁnally increases the
average productivity in the industry.
3.2 The importance of geographic proximity and agglomeration on spillovers
According to Marshall (1920) three sources of agglomeration externalities can be iden-
tiﬁed. Locating near each other provides ﬁrms access to specialized input, suppliers
and customers, a local market for skilled labour, and technological spillovers through
information exchange. The local pool of skilled labour provides a gain for both work-
ers and individual production units by maximising the job-matching opportunities and
thus reducing the search costs (Gordon and McCann 2000; Krugman 1991). A lo-
calised industry can support more suppliers, which increases the level of specialisation
and efﬁciency of the supply base (Harrison 1992).
The Marshall-Arrow-Romer externalities (deﬁned in this way from Glaeser, Kallal,
Scheinkman and Shleifer 1992) are knowledge spillovers external to a ﬁrm but inter-
nal to an industry and within a geographic region. Because human capital acquisition
and imitation are considered important channels for knowledge spillovers, domestic
ﬁrms located near multinationals may be more likely to beneﬁt than other ﬁrms. As the
theory from the economic geographic literature predicts, when knowledge is more tacit
in nature, face to face interaction and communication are important and geographic
proximity may help transmit knowledge more effectively (Von Hipple 1994). While it
may be possible to learn certain skills by imitation, it may be extremely costly to im-
itate without close observation. Many communication processes involve an exchange
of information and geographical proximity that may allow the exchange partners to ob-
serve each other’s behaviour to avoid moral hazard problems. Proximity may facilitate
the creation of social networks and lead to informal information-sharing. Personal re-
lations and face-to-face communication between the employees and managers of ﬁrms
located close to each other may lead to a higher level of knowledge transfer between
them (Halpern and Murak¨ ozy 2007). Moreover, low mobility of labour can be a strong
obstacle for technology spillovers when domestic ﬁrms are located far from foreign in-
vestors. It is commonly argued that European labour markets are very rigid compared
to the US labour market and people are less mobile in a geographical sense.
3 This criticism applies to older cross-sectional or industry-level studies. More recent ﬁrm panel studies
usually control for industry ﬁxed effect while using ﬁrm ﬁxed effect estimators.
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Another spillover channel is competition. Greater competitive pressure faced by
local ﬁrms may induce them to introduce new technology, to work harder, improving
their productivity and production to defend their market share, but may also worsen
their situation and push them out from the market. This crowding out effect may do-
minate in the beginning, but may be reversed in the long run due to the long term
positive effects of foreign ﬁrms on domestic entrepreneurship as a result of learning,
demonstration, networking and linkage effects between foreign and domestic ﬁrms (De
Backer and Sleuwaegen 2002; Barrios et al. 2005), even if the positive effects may be
limited to the more technologically advanced ﬁrms or ﬁrms belonging to the R&D
intensive sector (Sembenelli and Siotis 2005; Hale and Longe 2006).
Numerous econometric studies have focused on the geographic dimension of ho-
rizontal spillovers. Jaffe, Trajtenberg and Henderson (1993) show the signiﬁcance of
face-to-face contacts in the process of technological learning, while Audretsch and
Feldman (1996) provide evidence that spillovers are geographically bounded and that
the cost of transmitting knowledge rises with spatial distance. Adams and Jaffe (1996)
and Adams (2002) show that knowledge spillovers are stronger within a given distance.
Drifﬁeld (2000) examines the role of productivity spillovers from inward investment in
the UK using sector-level data and ﬁnds positive productivity spillovers from foreign
investors in the same sector and region. Si¨ oholm (1999), using detailed micro-data
from the Indonesian manufacturing sector, examines the effect on productivity from
foreign investors. He shows that domestic ﬁrms beneﬁt from foreign investors, but
the effect differs between groups of industries and spillovers from foreign investors are
found in sectors with a high degree of competition. However, he does not ﬁnd evidence
of spillovers at the regional level. Some studies have found positive spatial spillovers
of foreign investors (Bernstein and Mohnen 1998; Branstetter 2001) and positive pro-
ductivity spillovers at the regional level (Grifﬁth et al. 2002), but others have found no
or negative spillovers taking into account the regional component (Aitken and Harrison
1999; Zucker and Darby 1998; Ke and Luger 1996). Girma and Wakelin (2002) ﬁnd
evidence for positive spillovers from foreign investors in the same region and sector
in the United Kingdom, but the results are signiﬁcant only for ﬁrms that have a low
technology gap compared to multinationals.
There is only one study, according to my knowledge, about the effects of geo-
graphic proximity with foreign investors on domestic ﬁrms in transition countries.
Halpern and Murak¨ ozy (2007) analyze spillovers in Hungary: ﬁrst, they ﬁnd no evi-
dence of horizontal spillovers, but when they take distance into consideration, they ﬁnd
positive horizontal spillovers for domestic ﬁrms close to foreign-owned ﬁrms. The
distance between foreign and domestic ﬁrms matters and plays an important role in
determining the magnitude of the spillover effect: horizontal spillovers decrease with
distance. They conclude that spillovers via labour mobility may play an important role
over small distances, while competition is the dominant channel over long distances
(Halpern and Murak¨ ozy 2007, p. 801).
Domestic ﬁrms that are located along the national borders might beneﬁt from
spillovers from foreign investors located in neighbour countries. Cie´ slik (2005) ana-
lyzes the effect of border effects for the location of foreign ﬁrms in Poland using a
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regional data set from the 1990s. His study ﬁnds that regions located along the Polish
segment of the Eastern frontier of the enlarged European Union are less attractive to
foreign investors compared to other Polish regions. The analysis of the effect of dis-
tance from the national border and the closest country on the productivity of domestic
ﬁrms are not shown in this paper since they probably refer to vertical spillovers (re-
lationship with customers and suppliers) and a deep analysis would require more data
that are not available. This paper focuses on horizontal spillovers and on the role of
foreign investors in the Czech Republic.
On the basis of the existing theory and empirical research, as discussed above, I
propose the following hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: The distance from foreign investors is positively associated with domes-
tic ﬁrm’s performance.
Hypothesis 2: The density of foreign investors in the region is negatively associated
with domestic ﬁrm’s performance.
4. Data and methodology
The choice of the population of privatized ﬁrms in one industrial sector allows for
control of some relevant differences between privatized and new ﬁrms and reduces the
ﬁrm’s heterogeneity and variance.
The data used in this analysis come from different sources: the companies’ annual
reports available for the public in the business register, the Magnus Database, the As-
pekt Reports, and the National Property Fund of the Czech Republic. This analysis
is focused on ﬁrms in the Czech Republic in sector 26100, according to the Indus-
trial Classiﬁcation of Economic Activities (CZ-NACE code), i.e. ﬁrms engaged in the
manufacturing of glass and glass products. The panel includes only ﬁrms that existed
before 1989 and for which ﬁnancial data are available, which allows for an unbalanced
panel of 42 ﬁrms with data from 1990 to 2006. The population of the privatized glass
ﬁrms is small compared to large databases that are used in much empirical research
about spillovers in transition countries. However, the population is narrow because of
the nature of the object of the research (privatized ﬁrms in the glass sector) and the
availability of ﬁnancial data. Therefore, the small number of ﬁrms fully represents
the population of privatized glassworks but cannot be considered representative for the
whole glass industry.
Some glassworks have more processing plants. For my analysis, I have taken into
account the location of headquarters and not of the processing plants. The reasons
for this choice are the following. First, most of the ﬁnancial data available pertain
to the whole company concern and are not available for the single productive plants.
Second, even if spillovers might spill from the productive plant to the neighbourhood
area, usuallyinformationabouttheproduction, productsandtechnologymovefromthe
production plants to the headquarters through the management and communications
between the ﬁrm’s departments. Finally, usually the production plants are located close
to the headquarters and when a company has several plants, it is difﬁcult to choose one
of them for the location of spillovers.
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The analysis focuses on domestic ﬁrms. When a domestic ﬁrm is acquired from
a foreign investor, e.g. in the case of Glavunion a.s. — today AGC Flat Glass Czech
a.s. (Galeotti and Nollen, 2008), this company is designated as foreign and is excluded
from the panel data used for the statistical analysis. A company is considered “foreign”
if more than 50% of the ownership belongs to foreign investors: I have chosen this per-
centage as threshold to distinguish foreign from domestic ﬁrms because with a lower
percentage foreign investors might have a fairly limited effect on the management of
the company.
In the international technology diffusion literature (see Keller 2002), the effect of
geographical proximity is measured by physical distance (a continuous variable) be-
tween countries. On the contrary, the literature on foreign investors studies the impact
of multinationals on the productivity of domestic ﬁrms within regions of a country
by using discrete measures of foreign investors (for example dichotomizing the total
amount of foreign investments in the region and outside the region).
In this paper I measure geographical proximity using the distance in kilometers
of each ﬁrm from the closest foreign investor and the density of foreign investors at
regional level using the employment of foreign ﬁrms in the region.
It is necessary to specify that I do not measure spillovers directly, as many em-
pirical studies have tried to do it with different proxies, using — for example — the
relationship between the level of foreign involvement in an industry (measured by the
share of labor force in the industry employed by foreign ﬁrms or by the extent of fo-
reign ownership) and the total factor productivity growth in the sector. Because of the
difﬁculties in measuring spillovers and the various mechanisms which underlie them,
an analysis of the processes how spillovers occur is more relevant.
To eliminate the effect of inﬂation, I adjust variables measured in Czech crowns to
inﬂation using price indices of the glass sector (sector 26100) provided by the Czech
Statistical Ofﬁce.
In this paper, I use a panel data analysis. Panel data are a very useful instrument
because of their double dimension (that is, ﬁrms, industries or countries and time di-
mension). Panel data allow to taking into account ﬁrm’s heterogeneity and, at the same
time, the time dimension. Moreover, the introduction of speciﬁc effect enables to take
into consideration the inﬂuence of unobservable characteristics on the dependent vari-
able. The population of the privatized ﬁrms in the glass sector in the Czech Republic
is particularly suitable for panel data analysis because the population of ﬁrms is small
but data are available for a long number of years.
4.1 The dependent variable







where a denotes capital’s share of the value added. It is often assumed that a reason-
able estimate for a is between 0.25 (Prescott 1998) and 0.35 (Collins, Bosworth and
Rodrik 1996). In our analyses a is set to 0.3 (Caselli 2005).
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As an alternative measure of performance, I use the level of labour productivity
(measured as total sales per employee) of domestic ﬁrms in model 3 and 4.
4.2 Explanatory variables
I use the distance in kilometers from the closest foreign investor to measure the geo-
graphical proximity to foreign direct investors while I use the number of employees
in foreign ﬁrms in the region to measure the agglomeration of foreign investors. As
control variables, I include the ﬁrm’s characteristics such as ﬁrm size, ﬁrm’s age, a
variable which indicates if the company was privatized or if it still state-owned, the
percentage of machine-made production and the capital-labour ratio. Moreover, I in-
clude variables that measure the competition effect, as the Lerner index and the density
of domestic ﬁrms at regional level, the latter measured by the number of employees of
domestic ﬁrms in the region.
Geographical proximity, agglomeration of foreign investors and competition
Distance from foreign investors I measure the distance in kilometers from the clos-
est foreign investor in the glass sector. The distance is measured using road-distance
data.4 No distinction is made for this variable between ﬁrms that produce hand-made
or automatic glass, since spillovers from foreign investors to domestic ﬁrms are ex-
pected mainly to happen in the management of the company and in other economical
aspects that affect the ﬁrms’ productivity, and not in the technological process of glass
production, as explained previously.
I expect this variable to have a negative sign if foreign investors have positive
spillovers on the productivity of domestic ﬁrms.
Density of foreign ﬁrms in the region I measure the agglomeration of foreign in-
vestments in a region with the number of employees working in foreign ﬁrms in the
glass sector in a region. An alternative measure for agglomeration effects is “the num-
ber of foreign ﬁrms in the region.” However, this alternative measure does not take into
account the weight of the foreign ﬁrm: a small foreign ﬁrm has probably a smaller im-
pact than a larger foreign ﬁrm in the geographic area. A measure of agglomeration that
uses “the number of employees in the region” captures also a crowding-out effect on
the regional labor market, since the competition of foreign ﬁrms might discourage do-
mestic ﬁrms and send them out from the market. When domestic ﬁrms exit the market,
the laid-off employees might start working for a foreign ﬁrm. But the opposite could
happen. Domestic workers could work for some time for a foreign ﬁrm and later leave
the foreign ﬁrm and start working for a domestic ﬁrm: this choice could positively af-
fect the productivity of domestic ﬁrm in a long period. Since this crowding-out effect
on the regional labor market can be considered a negative spillover of foreign ﬁrms, I
believe that the number of employees working in foreign ﬁrms in the glass sector in a
region is an appropriate measure of agglomeration of foreign investments in the region.
4Data obtained from the web-site www.mapy.cz.
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I expect this variable to have a positive sign if foreign investors have positive
spillovers on the productivity of domestic ﬁrms in the region.
Competition This variable captures differences in the market-power between ﬁrms
in different subsectors and in the competition in the glass sector.
As a measure of competition or market power, I have computed the Lerner index
for a ﬁrm i using total costs and revenues, i.e., the cost-price margin, as in Domowitz
et al. (1986). The Lerner index is an inverse measure of competition, a greater index
means lower competition, and it is deﬁned as:
CPMit =
Salesit +DInventoriesit −Payrollit −Material Costit
Salesit +DInventoriesit
As an alternative speciﬁcation of competition, I use a variable that indicates the
density of domestic ﬁrms in the region, measured with the number of employees of
domestic ﬁrms in the region.
The effect of competition can be twofold: greater competitive pressure faced by
local ﬁrms may induce them to introduce new technology, to work harder, to improve
their market share, but may also push them out from the market. However, this crowd-
ing out effect may be reversed in the long run (De Backer and Sleuwaegen 2002; Bar-
riosetal.2005), atleastforthemoretechnologically advanced ﬁrmsorﬁrmsbelonging
to the R&D intensive sector (Sembenelli and Siotis 2005; Hale and Longe 2006).
The competition also derives from the agglomeration in an industrial sector at the
regional level. In order to separate the effects of the competition of foreign investors
from the competition of domestic ﬁrms, I measure the competition from local ﬁrms
with the density of domestic ﬁrms in the region.
Agglomeration in industrial clusters or at regional level has positive as well as ne-
gative effects; the positive expected effects are potential knowledge spillovers, since
proximity magniﬁes the opportunities of learning, and stimulates innovation by com-
petition on human capital. Negative effects are, for example, the limitation of product
innovation that needs new ideas and differentiation (Callois 2008).
The cited literature suggests an expected positive sign for the coefﬁcient of the
Lerner index variable. I expect that domestic ﬁrms that have a higher monopoly po-
sition have a higher productivity than the others. The sign of the density of domestic
ﬁrms present in the region can have both signs, depending on the type of dominant
effect and on the behaviour of domestic ﬁrms. Domestic ﬁrms in the region might
have a collusion behaviour among them which would increase their performance at
the expenditures of consumers. Or the knowledge effect might prevail. In these cases
this variable will have a positive sign. However, an excess of domestic density or con-
gestion in the region, might create a stealing effect and therefore a negative effect on
productivity will be expected.
Firm’s characteristics
Firm size I use the number of employees as ﬁrm size. Existing studies present op-
posing results about the effect of ﬁrm size on ﬁrm performance. Larger ﬁrms might be
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more proﬁtable than small ﬁrms because of the advantages associated with economies
of scale and scope (Kang and Stulz 1997) and outperform them in terms of technology
and competitiveness, as the studies from Wagner (1993) and Nguyen Van, Laisney
and Kaiser (2004) suggest. On the other hand, small ﬁrms might have an advantage
over large enterprises because they are more ﬂexible and they can adapt quicker to a
changing economic environment (Nguyen Van, Laisney and Kaiser 2004). However,
according to Desai et al. (2003) markets with better economic institutions and lower
levels of capital rationing are characterized by a higher number of small ﬁrms that
can enter and survive in the market and average ﬁrm size is expected to be smaller.
This last hypothesis is partly supported from the evidence. American ﬁrms enter, on
average, at a smaller scale and with lower productivity, many ﬁrms exit shortly after
entering while the ﬁrms who survived quickly converge to the industry average size
and productivity level; in Africa, on the contrary, the largest and most productive ﬁrms
have the highest growth rate and are more likely to survive (Van Biesebroeck 2005).
Other studies in less developed countries show a negative relation between ﬁrm size
and growth rate (Sleuwaegen and Goedhuys 2002; Mead and Liedholm 1998).
I expect a positive effect of ﬁrm’s size on the performance of domestic ﬁrms be-
cause the advantages associated with economies of scale and the scope in the glass
sector appear to be especially relevant in an sector that is characterized, internationally,
by the existence of an oligopolistic market.
Age I use the number of years from the foundation of the ﬁrm. The literature shows
that, because of learning-by-doing effects, older ﬁrms might grow faster than younger
ﬁrms. However, this positive effect might be counteracted by “organizational geri-
atrics” (Agarwal and Gort 1996), which derives from the obsolescence and deprecia-
tion of ﬁrm’s initial human capital and physical capital. Because of these conﬂicting
effects, theliterature on theimpact of age on ﬁrm’sperformance isinconclusive and the
results depend on data and on the estimation method used (Sutton 1997). In a transition
country, older ﬁrms might be disadvantaged compared to younger ﬁrms, because they
had to overcome the transition process, which implies learning new habits and new
ways of doing business. On the other hand, the glass sector has a long tradition in the
Czech Republic, which has been historically prominent in the glass manufacturing, so
that is likely to be connected with some relevant characteristics of the glasswork such
as the prestige of the brand and the long tradition. Older glassworks have a long tradi-
tion in the manufacturing sector and have famous brands (like Moser, Crystalex, Sklo
Bohemia). However, I have not found an appropriate measure that allows to order or to
distinguish the glassworks according to the prestige deriving from the brand/mark and
tradition. I have found the following rankings “Czech Sector Award” and ”ˇ CEKIA-
CRA Ranking” provided from ˇ Cesk´ a kapit´ alov´ a informaˇ cn´ ı agentura, a.s. and CRA
Rating Agency a.s.5 The ﬁrst ranking is available only from 1993 to 1998, while the
latter one is available from 1993 to 2003. I have added this index in some regressions,
even if the sample is reduced – because of the lack of this index from 2004. But even if
the rank would be available for 2004-2006, it would not be an appropriate indicator for
prestige from the brand/mark and tradition. The reason is that these rankings rank ﬁrms
5http://www.cekia.cz/?idf=csa-ranking
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according to ﬁnancial criteria and therefore these ranks are likely to be the consequence
of better economic performance (the dependent variable in my regressions) rather than
a cause. These indexes therefore do not explain the advantages of some Czech ﬁrms
compared to others. However, I have included a dummy variable for a higher ranking
from the above indexes in some regressions. The result is, as expected, that this vari-
able is signiﬁcant (ﬁrms that received a high ranking had a higher ﬁrm’s performance)
but the variable “age” does not loose signiﬁcance. For the above reasons, I have not
included the variable for “ﬁnancial ranking” and I have kept the variable “age” in the
regressions.
Since age is taken as an indicator for prestige from the brand and from the long tra-
dition of the glasswork, a positive sign from the coefﬁcient of this variable is expected.
Privatization I measure the impact of privatization with a binary variable that indi-
cates if the glasswork was privatized or if it is still state-owned (the dummy has value 1
if the glasswork was privatized, 0 if it is still state-owned).
Most surveys of the earlier empirical studies about privatization have suggested
that a change from state to private ownership tends to improve economic performance
(Djankov and Murrell 2000, 2002; Megginson and Netter 2001). However, Hanousek
et al. (2007) show that the earlier studies suffer from serious data problems and inad-
equate treatment of endogeneity of ownership. They use a panel data on a majority of
the medium and large ﬁrms that went through mass privatization in the Czech Repub-
lic. They found that the performance effects of privatization in the Czech Republic are
on the whole limited and that many types of private owners do not have a performance
that is different from that of ﬁrms with state ownership (Hanousek et al. 2007). The
only exceptions are concentrated foreign and domestic owners.
I might expect that privatized ﬁrms perform better than state-owned ﬁrms. How-
ever, since I have a long panel data with data until 2006, I expect my results to align
with that from Hanousek et al. (2007) in concerning the effect of privatization on the
performance of domestic ﬁrms.
Capital intensity and type of production In order to control for capital deepening,
I have introduced a variable that indicates the capital intensity of the ﬁrm (capital per
worker), measured as the ratio of total assets to the number of employees. In the glass
sector there exist different subsectors that differentiate ﬁrms. Glassworks manufacture
different products with various techniques. The main difference between glassworks
ﬁrms is automatic versus hand-made production. I include a control variable that indi-
cates the percentage of automatic or machine-made production.
I expect a positive sign for the coefﬁcient of both these variables on the perfor-
mance of domestic ﬁrms.
Table1showsthedescriptivestatisticsforthesampleusedintheregressions. There
is high variability among the total factor productivity and labour productivity of Czech
ﬁrms in the glass sector. The dataset includes glassworks that have a long history in
the Czech Republic, some of them were privatized early, while others not. The average
domestic glasswork has a machine-made production of 37% and the variability in the
percentage of automatic production and in the capital-labour ratio of the sample is also
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high. The Lerner index ranges theoretically from 0 to 1. However, this ratio might be
also negative, if some ﬁrms have higher costs than revenues from sales, as it is the case
for some domestic glassworks.
Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Within
variation
Total factor productivity 50.28 12.90 12.39 90.48 10.04
Labour productivity 428.72 145.15 28.65 857.40 73.39
Distance in km from the closest
foreign investor 95.47 33.81 0 176.00 15.06
Number of employees of foreign
investor in the region 29.63 119.58 0 584.00 23.14
Firm size: number of employees 911.02 1032.69 57.00 4971 305.86
Age 161.90 127.48 38.00 562.00 3.12
Dummy for the privatization 0.962 0.191 0 1.00 0.173
Capital labour ratio 678.01 275.61 109.95 1440.87 139.46
Machine-made production (%) 37.12 35.81 0 100.00 2.39
Market power (Lerner index) 0.025 0.19 −0.78 0.84 0.12
Number of employees of domestic
ﬁrms in the region 4567.28 3136.30 80.00 9551.00 1442.85
Source: Author’s calculation based on companies annual reports.
Note: N = 138. Labour productivity given in thousands of Czech koruna.
4.3 The estimation model
The basic estimated equations are the following:
TFPit =a +b1Distanceit +b2DensityFDIit +b3Sizeit +b4Ageit +b5DumPrivit+
+b6CapLabRatioit +b7MachineProdit +b8MarketPowerit+
+b9DensityDOMit +Dumt + fi+eit,
LabourProductivityit =a +b1Distanceit +b2DensityFDIit +b3Sizeit +b4Ageit+
+b5DumPrivit +b6CaplabRatioit +b7MachineProdit+
+b8MarketPowerit +b9DensityDomit +Dumt + fi+eit,
where fi represents an individual effect, Dumt year dummies, and eit is an error term.
Time dummies are included in the equations because they help control for aggregate
macroeconomic shocks, e.g. business cycles, political reforms, international crises.
The Hausman test suggests that the ﬁxed effect model is the more appropriate for
the theoretical model and the panel data, and the results of the speciﬁcation tests sup-
port the ﬁxed effect model in all models. The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis
that the random effect model is more efﬁcient than the ﬁxed effect model that is less
efﬁcient but consistent. The ﬁxed effect model uses the time variation in the dependent
variable and in the independent variables “within” each cross-sectional observation
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(Wooldridge 2002), allowing to analyze the effect of geographical proximity and ag-
glomeration of foreign investors on each domestic ﬁrm over time.
In order to choose between the pooled OLS model and the ﬁxed effect model, Bal-
tagi (2005, p. 13) advices to run a F-test, which is a Chow test with the restricted
residual sums of squares (RRSS) being that of OLS on the pooled model and the
unrestricted residual sums of squares (URSS) being that of the LSDV (Least Square
Dummy Variable) regression.
The results of the F-test indicate that the ﬁrms’ dummies are jointly signiﬁcant and
that OLS estimates which omit these ﬁrms dummies suffer from an omission variables
problem rendering them biased and inconsistent.
Amongthenecessaryassumptionsofthemodel, multi-collinearitymustbechecked.
Although multi-collinearity does not bias the coefﬁcients, it does make them more un-
stable and it is hard to get good estimates of their distinct effects on some dependent
variables. Moreover, with multi-collinearity standard errors may get large, and vari-
ables that appear to have no signiﬁcant effects individually may actually have quite
strong signiﬁcant effects as a group (Wooldridge 2003). I have checked for multi-
collinearity effects using a Pearson correlation matrix and the correlation table is avai-
lable in the Appendix.
5. Empirical results
I explore the impact of geographical proximity and agglomeration of foreign investors
on the productivity of domestic ﬁrms in the privatized glass sector in the Czech Re-
public. I have estimated four different models of ﬁxed effect regressions using two
different dependent variables: two models with total factor productivity (models 1
and 2), and two models with labour productivity (models 3 and 4). Since the agglom-
eration of domestic ﬁrms and the agglomeration of foreign ﬁrms might be related, I
have made two models where only the agglomeration of foreign ﬁrms is included (mo-
dels 1 and 3), and two models where the agglomeration of domestic and foreign ﬁrms
are both included (models 2 and 4).
The results presented in Table 2 show that geographic proximity and agglomeration
of foreign investors have a signiﬁcant effect on the total factor productivity and on the
labour productivity of privatized domestic ﬁrms in the glass sector. Domestic ﬁrms
that are close to foreign investors have a lower total factor productivity and labour
productivity than domestic ﬁrms that are more far away from them, as expressed from
the positive coefﬁcient of the variable that measures the distance in kilometers from
the closest foreign investor, signiﬁcant at 5% level. Increasing distance from foreign
investors by 1 km would increase the total factor productivity of an average domestic
ﬁrm by 13.5%, taking into account the effect of the density of domestic ﬁrms as well
(model 2). Increasing distance from foreign investors by 1 km would increase the
labour productivity of an average domestic ﬁrm by 86.9% (model 4). The stronger
effect of distance from foreign investors on labour productivity is consistent with the
hypothesis that foreign investors in the neighbourhood have a stealing effect; foreign
investors might attract the best and most productive workers, which would decrease
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the labour productivity of domestic ﬁrms, or might steal a part of the market share of
domestic ﬁrms.
Table 2. Results of ﬁxed effect regressions
Total factor productivity Labour productivity
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Geographical proximity and agglomeration of foreign investors
Distance in km from the closest 0.137∗∗ 0.135∗∗ 0.852∗∗ 0.869∗∗
foreign investor (0.064) (0.063) (0.385) (0.383)
Number of employees of foreign −0.057∗ −0.061∗ −0.405∗ −0.405∗
investor in the region (0.031) (0.031) (0.219) (0.216)
Competition effect
Market power (Lerner index)
20.94∗∗∗ 22.65∗∗∗ −8.076 −8.994
(7.095) (7.086) (52.19) (51.64)
Number of employees of domestic −0.013∗ −0.011∗∗
ﬁrms in the region (0.001) (0.005)
Firms characteristics
Firm size: number of employees
0.006∗ 0.008∗∗ 0.044∗ 0.062∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.025) (0.026)
Age
2.890∗∗∗ 2.554∗∗ 16.84∗∗∗ 15.12∗∗∗
(0.485) (0.516) (3.231) (3.522)
Privatized company
−1.693 0.108 −50.73 −31.85
(5.624) (5.657) (37.77) (38.63)
Capital labour ratio
0.006 0.008 0.141∗∗ 0.127∗
(0.009) (0.009) (0.067) (0.067)
Machine-made production (%)
−0.051 −0.216 −3.101 −3.673
(0.353) (0.361) (2.308) (2.308)
Constant
−431.0∗∗∗ −370.9∗∗∗ −2366∗∗∗ −2039∗∗∗
(75.98) (82.43) (511.2) (567.7)
R2 (within) 0.514 0.529 0.534 0.569
N 0138 0138 0135 0135
F statistic i0∗∗∗ i0∗∗∗ i0∗∗∗ i0∗∗∗
Source: Author’s calculation based on companies annual reports.
Note: Time dummies are included in all models. Standard errors in parentheses. ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote signiﬁ-
icance at 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively.
The number of employees in foreign ﬁrms has a signiﬁcant negative effect at 10%
level on the total factor productivity and labour productivity of domestic ﬁrms in the
region. The effect of the density of foreign investors in the region is also stronger on
labour productivity than on total factor productivity. The signs of these two variables
are coherent with the existence of negative horizontal spillovers from foreign investors
on the productivity of domestic ﬁrms and with the view that a crowding out effect and
negative consequences of competition prevail, instead of the potential beneﬁts from
being close to foreign investors.
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Looking at ﬁrms’ characteristics that could affect ﬁrm’s performance, the ﬁrm’s
age has a signiﬁcant positive effect at 1% signiﬁcance level. The long tradition of the
glass manufacturing in the Czech Republic explains why a learning-by-doing effect do-
minates and why younger ﬁrms might be disadvantaged compared to older ones. The
signiﬁcance of age of the company is probably connected with the fact that older glass-
works have a higher mark-up achieved thanks to using a traditional brand. However, a
more appropriate variable for measuring the prestige deriving from using a traditional
brand was not found. The age of the company has a positive effect on the total factor
productivity and on the labour productivity. The effect of age is stronger on labour
productivity than on total factor productivity.
Firm size, expressed by the number of employees, is signiﬁcant at 10% level in
all models: larger domestic ﬁrms have a higher total factor productivity and a higher
labour productivity than smaller ﬁrms.
The role of capital-labour ratio is interesting. This variable has signiﬁcant positive
effect at 10% level on the ﬁrm’s labour productivity, but it does not affect the total
factor productivity. Glassworks with a higher capital-labour ratio have higher sales
per employee. The capital-labour ratio, however, does not affect signiﬁcantly the total
factor productivity.
The percentage of machine-made production does not have a signiﬁcant effect on
the productivity of Czech glassworks. The privatization is also not signiﬁcant, cohe-
rently with the most recent empirical studies about privatization, that found low or no
effects of privatization on ﬁrm’s performance (Hanousek et al. 2007).
The Lerner index has a positive effect on total factor productivity at the 1% level
but it is not signiﬁcant on labour productivity. This suggests that the ﬁrm’s market
power does not affect signiﬁcantly the labour productivity, as the quality of the labour
force can do, or the amount of capital used in the manufacturing of glass. On the other
hand, the ﬁrm’s market power, which is an indication of inverse competition, strongly
affects the total factor productivity.
In models 2 and 4, I have added a variable that indicates the density of domes-
tic ﬁrms at the regional level. I have included this variable among the variables that
indicate the competition effect. The literature has shown that the effect of proximity
in industrial clusters can be both positive and negative. In some cases a concentra-
tion of ﬁrms in the same sector and area can bring to several positive externalities, as
knowledge spillovers and reduction of ﬁxed costs. However, product innovation can be
limited, because for creating new products new ideas and diverse ﬁrms are essentials
(Callois 2008).
When I include the variable of density of domestic ﬁrms in the region, the coef-
ﬁcient of the variables that indicate the geographical proximity and agglomeration of
foreign investors do not loose signiﬁcance. The effect of domestic density in the region
is signiﬁcant at 5% on the labour productivity and at 10% on the total factor producti-
vity. A higher domestic density in the region has a negative effect on the productivity
of domestic ﬁrms. This might mean that domestic ﬁrms in the glass sector do not help
each other with exchange of knowledge spillovers, but that a congestion of ﬁrms in the
same region reduces the proﬁt and performance of the whole sector, stealing poten-
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tial clients and market shares from each other. The difference in the signiﬁcance level
of this variable on the total factor productivity and labour productivity might be ex-
plained by the fact that domestic ﬁrms steal the best or more productive workers from
other ﬁrms in the region.
If I compare my results with the evidence in other transition countries, this study
contrasts the results from Halpern and Murak¨ ozy (2007) which found a positive effect
of distance from foreign investors on horizontal spillovers in Hungary. Being closer
to a foreign investor located in the Czech Republic has a negative effect on the pro-
ductivity of privatized domestic ﬁrms. However, the role of spillovers from foreign
investors seems to be less important than the role of ﬁrm’s characteristics, such as
ﬁrm’s age, connected with the prestige of the brand and of the glasswork, ﬁrm size and
ﬁrm’s market power for total factor productivity.
The results of this study depend on the chosen industrial sector and cannot be ge-
neralized to other sectors. However, these results align with the previous empirical
evidence that has found negative horizontal spillovers in transition countries and sup-
ports the view that foreign investors do not always have the expected positive effects
on domestic ﬁrms.
6. Conclusions
This paper analyzes the effects of geographical proximity and agglomeration of foreign
investors on domestic ﬁrms in the privatized glass sector in the Czech Republic. This
paper focuses on horizontal spillovers and on the role of foreign investors in the Czech
Republic.
I have investigated whether the geographical proximity to foreign investors and the
agglomeration of foreign investors have a positive effect on the productivity of domes-
tic ﬁrms using a data set from 42 privatized ﬁrms in the glass sector. I have presented
different regression models that show that the geographical proximity to foreign in-
vestors has a negative and signiﬁcant effect on the productivity of domestic ﬁrms at a
5% signiﬁcance level and that the agglomeration of foreign investors has a signiﬁcant
but negative effect on the productivity of domestic ﬁrms at a 10% signiﬁcance level.
The density of domestic ﬁrms at the regional level has a negative and signiﬁcant effect
at 5% level on the labour productivity of domestic ﬁrms and at 10% level on the total
factor productivity.
The results of the econometrical analysis give evidence that in the glass sector the
spatial distribution of domestic and foreign ﬁrms following the privatization has not
been beneﬁcial to domestic ﬁrms. The explanation may be that foreign investors have
chosen the best ﬁrms, as shown by Galeotti and Ryˇ sav´ a (2008), and can be due also
to congestion effects of domestic ﬁrms in some regions. The economic crisis that the
glass sector experienced after 2001 in the Czech Republic is another reason. It would
be interesting to analyze the effect of geographic proximity with foreign investors in
the 1990s and after to check if the effect of foreign investors in the beginning of the
transition is different than in a later period. However, the split of the population in two
samples would create problems of robustness to the statistical results, therefore this
AUCO Czech Economic Review, vol. 3, no. 1 41E. Galeotti
procedure is not feasible with this data.
This study does not ﬁnd the positive effects of agglomeration and geographical
proximity to foreign investors in the Czech Republic as the knowledge spillovers that
the literature suggests. Foreign investors in the Czech Republic do not have posi-
tive spillovers on domestic ﬁrms in the same industrial sector. However, the role of
spillovers from foreign investors in the glass sector seems to be less important than the
role of ﬁrm’s characteristics, such as the ﬁrm’s age, which indicates the prestige of the
brand and of the glasswork, ﬁrm size and ﬁrm’s market power.
Following the above discussion and taking into account the results of models 1–4
for horizontal spillovers, the results support the Hypothesis 1 and Hypothesis 2. The
evidence of this paper aligns with the previous empirical studies about spillovers that
have found mostly negative or insigniﬁcant horizontal spillovers. The results about
border effects represent a possible future research path.
The choice of an industrial sector hinders the generalization of these results to other
sectors. However, I believe that this study points out the relevance of the mechanisms
of spillovers and the need of further research about this topic in other industrial sectors
in transition countries.
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